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Justice William Brennan died on 24th.July, 1997 aged ninety one, leaving
constitutional discourse in America much the livelier for his thirty three years
on the Supreme Court. When he joined the Court in 1956, many Americans
were still afraid to speak out against McCarthyism. At that time the states still
defined the content of a person's rights and these did not necessarily include
the right to counsel in a criminal case, to marry the person of your choice or
have your vote count equally with that of your neighbour. The first faltering
steps towards desegregating schools had been taken just before Brennan joined
the Court but racial equality was not on the agenda and gender equality was not
even contemplated outside radical circles. What amounted to a revolution in
civil rights in the years that followed was not the single handed work of
William Brennan, but no other hand contributed more to building a
constitutional base for social change. He was a technically brilliant lawyer, and
one who was mindful of the law's restraining as well as its energising forces.
Nevertheless he read the Constitution in the light of contemporary life as well
as the intentions of its Framers, in the light of its spirit as well as by the
dictionary and in the light of an old saying of Oliver Wendell Holmes that "it is
perfectly proper to regard and study law as a great anthropological document.'"
Its central meaning was never unclear to him. It was to secure the blessings of
liberty and equality. How much of these, how far, and in the face of what
competing interests is of course the stuff of conflict and Justice Brennan was
sometimes on the winning side of hard fought decisions and sometimes left to
• Director, William J.Brennan Project, the University of Glasgow.
1 Quoted in William J.Brennan, "Law and Social Sciences Today" The Gaston Lecture,
Georgetown University, 25th.November, 1957.
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hone his skills as one of the great dissenters of American constitutional law.
Unsurprisingly, his legacy is one which includes great liberty enhancing
opinions which may be modified in the future but not overlooked, some great
dissents which he died hoping would one day become law, and some very
divided views on his liberal jurisprudence, though not on the man himself. He
was loved by everybody who knew him.
Born the second of eight children of an Irish immigrant family in 1906,
William Brennan was living proof of the reality behind the American fairy tale,
the talented youngster brought up in the school of hard knocks and strong
family loyalties, who had an instinctive as well as intellectual belief in
opportunity, civic virtue and above all in the equal dignity and worth of all
people. He carried the name William Brennan Junior with more pride than any
noble title because it welded him to a father he loved and to generations of Irish
history taking root in a promised land. 2 When he was in his eighties and just
before he retired from the Court, he visited Ireland and Scotland, and confirmed
his lifelong affinity with his Celtic heritage and enjoyment of the wonderful
single malts produced in both countries!
Educated at Pennsylvania's Wharton School of Finance and Commerce and
later at Harvard Law School, Brennan's legal career began with a solid
professional base in Pitney, Hardin and Skinner and a developing expertise in
labour law before he went on to serve on New Jersey's state judiciary, where
his talents were rewarded with advancement to the state Supreme Court. It was
an interesting time in the state's judicial history, as the great Arthur
T.Vanderbilt reformed and modernised the courts, welcoming the contribution
of the energetic, personable Brennan who liked nothing better than to work in
times of change with a colleague of vision. Later Brennan was often asked if he
had learned anything as a state court judge which helped him later on the
United States Supreme Court. Curiously, very few Supreme Court justices have
advanced by this route. Brennan was only the third in the twentieth century,
following the great Holmes and Cardozo. "Apparently the Presidents who have
appointed Justices in this century have not valued state court service too
highly," he said later, too modest to draw attention to what a loss this was,
given the quality of that trio. 3 He believed that experience as a state judge was
2 Nat Henoff, "Profiles:The Constitutionalist" New Yorker Magazine, 12th.March, 1990
is an excellent study of early influences.
3 William J. Brennan, "State Court Decisions and the Supreme Court" - a speech to the
Pennsylvania Bar Association, Pittsburgh, 3rd.February, 1960.
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quite different and not altogether the best preparation. He wrote of an altered
perspective that comes when charged with the finality of interpreting the
Constitution. Where once he had been suspicious of some federal court
interventions in cases competently handled by the state courts, later he became
the most active of all his federal colleagues in expanding federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction to teach state courts higher standards of procedure in criminal
cases. If it did not endear him to a lot of state judges, he at least spoke with the
authority of having seven years of close encounters with the realities of state
court business.
In 1956 President Eisenhower appointed him to the Supreme Court. If there
was any truth in the oft told story that he later felt he had made a mistake,
believing that this useful moderate appointment of a Democrat would help him
win Irish immigrant votes in New Jersey and discovering that instead he had
moved a radical Trojan Horse to conservative Washington, seven more
Presidents would live to either bless or curse Ike's gift before Brennan retired
in 1990. What he did in these years bears critical examination. If his opinions
expanded press freedom, shaped thorough going reforms of criminal procedure,
gave real meaning to the equal protection clause's promises to black and female
Americans, freed speakers from restraints, and created access to courts and
administrative hearings for millions of Americans to pursue their rights, did he
not also do this at a price? Did he distort federalism? Was the price of
exuberant individualism the loss of collective and family values? Was the price
of equality paid by white and male Americans? Was the final cost one to
judicial method, turning law into politics?
Justice Brennan's understanding offederalism was inseparable from his
understanding of the Bill of Rights. Believing that it was the primary duty of
both state and federal governments to honour all of its guarantees of freedom,
he joined enthusiastically in the Court's opinions imposing new limitations on
the states in criminal trials. Historically, the Bill of Rights had been understood
to apply to the actions of the federal government but leaving the states free to
fashion their own criminal procedures restrained only by their own state
constitutions. It was a freedom which Justice Brennan and his liberal colleagues
believed had been often abused. 4 Poor and black defendants were at the mercy
of police methods and rules on admissibility of evidence which were generous
to the state's case and parsimonious about rights against self incrimination,
4 William J.Brennan, "The Bill of Rights and the States" The James Madison Lecture,
New York University, 15th.February, 1961.
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freedom from unreasonable search, and other essential aspects of due process.
The poor had no right to appointed counsel. From the 1930s onward, the
Supreme Court had begun to apply the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
to the states and this process of "nationalising" rights gathered pace in the
1960s. States were obliged to appoint counsel for indigents, to observe strict
limitations on the admissibility of evidence contaminated by failure to comply
with the fourth and fifth amendments, to provide speedy trials, and in short, to
observe all the guarantees of a fair process. 5 Justice Brennan's special
contribution lay in expanding federal remedies to encourage state compliance.
In 1963, in a decision which he rated as one of his most important, Fay v.
Naia, his controversial interpretation of the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act swept
away procedural obstacles to state prisoners seeking a hearing in a federal court
on the grounds that they were imprisoned because the state had violated a right
held under the federal Constitution. 6 This opinion was the first of several which
heralded a very significant expansion of federal remedies to state prisoners and
a great deal of new business for the federal district and circuit courts. Justice
Brennan was proud of this work. He believed that the federal courts were the
very arteries of the Bill of Rights. Rather than casting them as the bullies of the
federal system, intervening needlessly in state business, he saw them as the
dominies of federalism, involved in a dialogue between state and nation with
the Bill of Rights as class text. After all, the states which learned best how to
protect the rights of the accused would seldom see a decision of its courts
overturned on federal habeas corpus. His critics, and there were many, argued
that the expanded availability of federal review made prisoners restless and
litigious, and that it insulted state judges, undercutting the finality of their
decisions and robbing states of their autonomy. Justice Brennan lived to see
some of his work undone. Indeed the battle for habeas began in the 1970s when
the Court began to steer to the right. In the 1990s Fay v. Naia was effectively
overruled by the Court, and Congress itself limited habeas in the 1996
5 Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643 (1961) made the exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment
applicable to the states; prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, Robinson v. California
370 U.S. 660 (1962); right to counsel in Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335 (1963); prohibition
of self incrimination in Malloy v. Hogan 378 U. S. 1 (1964); inadmissibility of confessions in
absence of warnings of right to silence and to counsel during questioning inMiranda v. Arizona
384 U.S. 436 (1966); right to jury trial in criminal case in Duncan v. Louisiana 391 U.S. 145
(1968); double jeopardy in Benton v. Maryland 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
6372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. 7 Justice Brennan greatly regretted
that, but drew comfort from the substantial body of Warren Court opinions
which have survived and especially from the thirty years of education which
had yielded higher standards of trial procedure in the states.
It was by no means a paradox when this advocate of strong federal power to
guarantee rights latterly became known as the foremost advocate of a revived
state constitutionalism. In 1977, in one of the most cited law review articles of
all time, Justice Brennan lamented the erosion of rights which was the
consequence of the work of a more conservative Supreme Court and he turned
.to the states to lead the way forward. 8 There was, he argued, no reason why the
states could not provide higher standards of rights protection through their own
constitutions than the federal constitution. State judiciaries offering better
protection for free speech than the first amendment currently demanded could
make their decisions safe from federal review by resting them on "adequate and
independent state grounds," a doctrine which he had attacked fiercely in Fay
when it had been used by the states to shield a denial of individual rights! Some
critics smelled the cynical jurisprudence of lost votes in what seemed to be a
convenient about- tum brought on by being on the losing side now. 9 Yet there
was no inconsistency. His argument was that the Bill of Rights was a floor
below which the states were forbidden to fall. It was not a ceiling. When
travelling above its protections, the "state laboratories are once again open for
federal business." His new faith in state constitutionalism was consistent, too,
with his emphasis on persuasion and dialogue about rights, though with the
states as dominies this time. Time will tell how many of them will answer
Justice Brennan's call, and a lively debate goes on still about the health and
prospects of state constitutional law as a cutting edge of human rights. Before
Brennan, it was never even a question.
7 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C.2241 et seq. Among important
decisions cutting back on habeas, Coleman v. Thompson 501 U.S. 722 (1991) on procedural
default, and McCleskey v. Zant 499 U.S. 467 (1991) severely restricting 'successive'
applications.
8 William 1. Brennan, "State Constitutions and the protection of Individual Rights" 90
Harv.L.Rev. 489 (1976-77). Justice Brennan noted his satisfaction with subsequent developments
in "The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of
Individual Rights" The James Madison Lecture, New York University, 18th.November, 1986.
9 Earl M.Maltz, "False Prophet, Justice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional
Law" 15Hastings Const.L.Q. 429 (1987-88).
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For William Brennan the Bill of Rights was not an abstraction to be played
out in the arena of an equally abstract federalism. The individual was right at
the centre. Each and every individual was entitled to equal dignity, respect and
value. Translated into hundreds of his opinions, this meant some controversial
things, including the right of a newspaper to publish just about anything about a
public person, the right of a protester to bum the American flag, and a
prohibition on prayer in the classroom. His dissenting opinions caused even
more insomnia, contemplating a liberty of homosexuals to indulge in sodomy, a
freedom to fill airwaves with "Dirty Words", and even an America without the
death penalty. It was hardly surprising that conservatives criticised the
outcomes, or that they should ask where he got some of his answers from in
history, precedent and text. The old Warren style liberalism has come under
attack too from communitarians. 10 Brennan's vision was of a rights bearing
individual in potential conflict with a powerful government, state or federal,
sometimes needing protection from government and sometimes needing the
power of one government to protect her from another. Was the result a rampant
individualism at the expense of community, and the erosion of school, family
and state in the making and keeping of shared values?
Justice Brennan's opinions do not lack sensitivity to communities, though
they often evince an awareness of the vulnerability of those who do not
conform or share the race or creed of the majority in a local environment. His
role in keeping God out of the classroom, for example, was to fulfil the first
amendment's promise to Native American Indians, Hindus and Jews as well as
Christians that there would be no establishment of religion and that they would
enjoy free exercise of religion. The only safe unit to entrust, however, in order
to leave tribes, sects and churches to keep traditions and faiths was the
individual. He was a devout Catholic in his private life. Dissenting in Lynch v.
Donnelly to the proposition that a Christian nativity scene displayed in a public
place was not a violation of the establishment clause because there were so
many reindeers and clutter around it as to make it effectively secular, Justice
Brennan did not attack the community feeling that put it there, but instead
protected a message which he said was "best understood as a mystical re-
creation of an event that lies at the heart of the Christian faith. To suggest that
such a symbol is merely 'traditional' and therefore no different from Santa's
house or reindeer is offensive to those for whom the creche has profound
10 Robert C. Post, "Justice Brennan and Federalism" 7 Constitutional Commentary 227
(1990).
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significance."l] It is hard to see how community values are compromised by a
deep respect for faith, inclusive of all faiths. In Brennan's view, official
selection of messages by school or community compromised a value selected
by the Constitution.
Few other Justices have made such an impact on the balance of rights
between family, state and child. Whilst Brennan affinned that the foetus has no
rights by his unflagging support for Roe v. Wade 12 and his contribution to the
abortion debate, he helped to create the rights bearing child. He supported the
Court's decisions that minors seeking an abortion were not obliged to obtain
parental consent, and also broke new ground in a plurality opinion in Carey v.
Population Services in 1977, striking down New York's ban on the sale or
distribution of contraceptives to minors under sixteen and arguing for strict
scrutiny of state restrictions on contraception. 13 Access to contraceptives, even
for the young was "essential to the exercise of the constitutionally protected
right of decision in matters of childbearing." In Brennan's many opinions
concerning the rights of the child, he acknowledged that children have
constitutional rights, but not in exact measure with adults. Context was
important. A child might have a first amendment right to use language
containing sexual innuendo in some circumstances, but not necessarily to
escape discipline when he used it in a school speech. 14 Often his argument was
for representation of a child's interests separate from that of the state or the
parents, notably in delinquency cases where the child stood to lose her freedom,
or where parents sought the committal of the child to a mental institution. 15 He
consistently argued that the law should not penalise children because their
parents were unmarried or had an unconventional lifestyle, or deny them an
education because their parents were undocumented aliens.16
11465 U.S. 668 (1984).
12410 U.S.l13 (1973).
13431 U.S. 113 (1977).
14 Bethel School District, No.403 v. haser 478 U.S. 675 (1986) concurring opinion.
15 Parham v. JR. 442 U.S. 584 (1979), part dissenting. See Burt, "The Constitution and
the Family" 1979 Sup. Ct.Rev. 329 for a critique of Brennan's faith in court resolution.
16 Pickett v. Brown 462 U.S. 1 (1983) on illegitimacy and equal protection; Michael H.
v. Gerald D. 491 U.S. 110 (1990) on unconventional family relationships and due process; Plyer
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Brennan's rights bearing child was not intended to be a threat to the
community or the family, however. He reasoned that the child was the future
citizen, and that in addition to protection she needed respect and choice. Hence
he argued for access to ideas and information, and sometimes to lawyers and
courts rather than parents. Where right~ were concerned he was usually to be
found on the side which argued for the treatment of young people as mature,
responsible individuals. There was one notable exception. In Stanford v.
Kentucky in 1989, a majority on the Court concluded that children as young as
sixteen who kill, were eligible for the death penalty. 17 Justice Scalia argued that
children knew right from wrong, that their moral culpability was a matter for
individual assessment and that there was no national consensus against
executing them. Justice Brennan argued that juveniles as a class were less
morally culpable and aware of consequences, and more likely than adults to be
rehabilitated. He would thus excuse them as a class rather than as individuals
from death row. In the sense that he had never argued an identity of rights
between adults and children, it was not an inconsistent position to argue that
juveniles had a lesser responsibility. He never of course wavered from his
lifelong belief, expressed most comprehensively in Furman v. Georgia in 1972
that capital punishment was a violation of the eighth amendment's prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishment, arguing that "Death is today an unusually
severe punishment, unusual in its pain, in its finality and in its enormity."18
Justice Brennan's vigorous defence of individual rights did not indicate a lack
offaith in democracy but was a manifestation of it. Nowhere is this better
illustrated than in his opinions concerning freedom of speech and press. To
Justice Brennan the first amendment was the cornerstone of self government. It
created the conditions of informed debate and reached into every aspect of the
life of the mind, including the emotions and senses as well as the intellect. His
best known opinion is New York Times Co. v. Sullivan in 1964, holding that
criticism of the public conduct of officials was protected by the first
amendment even if the statement contained falsity, unless it was made with
v. Doe 457 U.S.202 (1982) on education and equal protection.
17492 U.S.A.361 (1989).
18408 U.S. 238 (1972) at 287. Justice Brennan and his colleague Justice Thurgood
Marshall dissented in every case thereafter imposing the death penalty, citing their respective
opinions in Furman.
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"actual malice." 19 One of America's best known theorists of free speech,
Alexander Meiklejohn, thought the opinion gave cause for "dancing in the
streets."20 It was not a perfect opinion. Juries have found difficulty with the
"actual malice" test, courts have found difficulty in drawing lines between
public and private people, and newspapers have complained of expensive
discovery costs. Nevertheless it signalled the end of restrictive libel laws which
chilled informed discussion and the beginning of an era in which the press has
enjoyed a great freedom, to investigate, expose and criticise. If it has not
always produced a high quality of debate and concerns raised thirty years after
Times have focussed on the intrusion of the press into privacy. The Court has
not yet had the opportunity to deal with the issues directly. It may be guessed
that Justice Brennan would have been cautious about abridging press freedom
to accommodate privacy. He consistently upheld publication of the names of
juveniles and rape victims where these were available on court record. In a
dictum in a 1967 case, Time Inc. v. Hill, he wrote that "newsworthiness" could
offer protection to the press from liability in a case involving invasion of
privacy.21 In this area, Justice Brennan made openness and access to
information a priority, possibly over a competing individual right to privacy.
Justice Brennan made as great an impact on the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment as he did on ·the rest of the Bill of Rights. It was he who
first put the word ''NOW'' into the vocabulary of school desegregation when
the Court's patience with Southern non-compliance wore thin in Green v.
County School Board in 1968.22 He was a strong advocate of using the strictest
standard of judicial review to unmask and uproot racial discrimination, but he
came to the view that the Court need be less suspicious of laws and
programmes designed to benefit minority races. In Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, he set out a considered and workable strategy for
reviewing affirmative action programmes under a less strict judicial standard,
thus freeing colleges and employers to set about recruiting members of
19376 U.S. 254 (1964). Anthony Lewis, Make No Law: The Sullivan Case and the First
Amendment (N.Y., Random House, 1991) is an excellent study of the case and aftermath.
20 Meiklejohn's comment reported in Kalven, "The New York Times Case: A Note on
the Central Meaning of the First Amendment" 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191.
21385 U.S. 374 (1967).
22391 U.S. 430 (1968).
13
DENNING LAW JOURNAL
minorities on preferential terms. 23 He wrote for a plurality on this point, and not
for a majority. His arguments triggered a debate on and off the Court, with
supporters arguing that affirmative action was a necessary, albeit temporary,
scaffolding until minorities achieved real equality, and opponents arguing that
it was divisive, that it benefitted individuals who had not suffered
discrimination personally, stigmatised them by suggesting they could not
succeed on merit, and discriminated against whites who were not proven to
have discriminated against anybody themselves. Until Brennan retired, the
Court continued to debate, and despite new and more conservative
appointments, often upheld affirmative action programmes. Indeed Justice
Brennan wrote the majority opinion in one such case in 1990, a Congressional
scheme for benefitting minorities in broadcasting, inMetro Broadcasting v.
F.C.c..24 Since his retirement it seems that affirmative action has gone out of
fashion. Justice Brennan seldom became downhearted when he witnessed
reversals or erosions of his opinions, believing that the life of the law was a
longer one than even his ninety one years and that good arguments would not
stay down. 25
Gender equality was a latecomer to the American Constitution but Justice
Brennan did much to ensure that it will stay. Reviewing the history of sex
discrimination in America, he came to the conclusion in Frontiera v.
Richardson that it should be treated just like race, as a suspect classification, a
way of differentiating between people which could only be justified by the
state's most compelling interests. 26 His nation had, he said, " a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination
was rationalised by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical
23 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Justice Brennan was joined by Justices White, Marshall and
Blackmun in his opinion that an 'intermediate' standard of review was a more appropriate
standard of review than 'strict scrutiny' where race was used as a benign classification. Two
years later a Court majority adopted Brennan's reasoning to uphold a Congressional plan of
affirmative action in the construction industry - Fullilove v. Klutznick 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
24497 U.S. 547 (1990). It was overruled inAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 115 S.Ct.
2097 (1995).
25 Sturm and Guinier, "The Future of Affirmative Action" 84 Cal.L.Rev. 953 and
Sunstein, "Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action and the Supreme Court" 84 Cal.L.Rev. 1179
for a discussion of alternative strategies for reviving it.
26410 U.S. 677 (1973).
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effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage." Although a majority of the
Court agreed with the result in this case, Brennan narrowly failed to win a
majority for his argument that gender, like race is "suspect." His colleagues
preferred to await the outcome of the Equal Rights Amendment to the
Constitution which was in the process of ratification at the time. They would
have waited a long time. The ratification period ended in 1982 without
attracting the requisite votes. Meanwhile Justice Brennan had the opportunity
to reshape this area of law by articulating a new standard of heightened review,
with a majority of colleagues in agreement. The case, Craig v. Boren has
become the benchmark of a whole new jurisprudence of twenty years standing,
and has been used recently to scrutinise gender differences as strictly as racial
ones in all but name, though affirmative action for women may be a casualty of
the same trends as in race.27
In a long career spanning thirty three years, he wrote a remarkable number of
benchmark opinions which remain the law, some more weatherbeaten than
others. There were times when he was on the losing side, only to find that
Congress recast the law in ways which reflected his opinions. One example is
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which rescued the essence of
Brennan's opinion in Sherbert v. Verner when that 1963 judgement reviewing
state laws burdening free exercise of religion by a strict "compelling interest"
standard was overruled by Scalia's opinion for the Court in Employment
Division of Oregon v. Smith. 28 Sometimes of course, Brennan opinions were
greeted by a howl of Congressional disapproval, as when he held that it was
"bedrock principle" of the first amendment that allowed one Gregory Johnson
to set fire to the American flag. 29 Justice Brennan gave Congress its place in the
ordered scheme of liberty, but did not draw back from interpreting the
Constitution in ways which displeased majorities. Nor would he defer to the
"original intention" of the Framers in the work of interpretation. He interpreted
27429 U.S. 190 (1976). A recent case in which the Craig standard was used in a manner
close to 'strict scrutiny' was US. v. Virginia 116 S.Ct. 2264 (1996), striking down Virginia
Military Institute's exclusion of women.
28 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub.L.No.103-141; 42 U.S.c. §2000 bb has,
as one of its stated purpose, "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner 374 U.S. 398." Employment Division v. Smith 494 U.S. 872 (1990) prompted the
response. His colleague, Justice Harry Blackmun provides many more examples in "A Tribute
to Mr.Justice Brennan" 26 Harv.CR.-CL.L.Rev.1 (1991).
29 Texas v. Johnson 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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the design and purpose of the Constitution as one intended to secure liberty by
trusting it to future generations. The design included a very important role for
the Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution and he welcomed it. "The
ultimate question must be, what do the words mean in our time," he wrote.
Such a role for the judiciary is bound to attract questions as to the role of value
judgements in the process of interpretation but as Justice Brennan argued in a
speech at Georgetown in 1985, attributing meanings to dead Framers or
traditions does not remove value judgements.3o
Perhaps the greatest disappointment of his career was to witness the revival
of capital punishment in America so soon after Furman v. Georgia seemed to
foretell its extinction. Already convinced that it was per se unconstitutional and
ari affront to human dignity, he remained on the Court long enough to despair
of his colleagues' attempts to square the procedures with due process and equal
protection. When he retired, he believed it was just as much a lottery as it had
been when the Court struck down Georgia's scheme in Furman for its
resemblance to lightning. In vain he and Justice Thurgood Marshall raged in
bitter dissents, unable to stop the Court from upholding Georgia's overtly
racially discriminatory scheme, or from confirming the eligibility of juveniles
and mentally retarded people for execution. Unusually he kept up the rage in
public after he left the bench, aware that the work to abolish the death penalty
was a mountain. "The final labor, it seems, will be left to the brave and able
hands and minds of those we leave behind," he wrote in 1994.31
The University of Glasgow is proud to have had Justice Brennan as a friend.
In 1989, a year before he retired, he came to Glasgow to receive an Honorary
LL.D. The visit was an overwhelming success. He charmed everyone who met
him. Lord McCluskey and he debated the issue as to whether the United
Kingdom should have a Bill of Rights, before an audience which included
many who were then actively engaged in considering Scotland's constitutional
future. Justice Brennan was optimistic. While he realistically admitted some of
America's failures, he did not believe that we should be paralysed by fears
about the politicisation of the judiciary. It would be, he thought, a rich
30 William I.Brennan, "The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification"
Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown University, Washington D.C., 12th.October, 1985.
For outspoken criticism of Justice Brennan's interpretative method, see "What Brennan
Wrought" The New Republic, 13th.August, 1990.
31 "Neither Victims Nor Executioners" 8 Notre Dame JL. Ethics & Pub. Pol 'y 1 (1994)
at 9.
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opportunity for dialogue and awareness of the value of human rights. Later he
came to the School of Law on a sunny July day and took questions from the
students. "Where does the right to abortion come from ...it isn't in the
Constitution?" "How did you feel about all the uproar last week when you
wrote the opinion about flagbuming?" "Is it difficult to work with Justice so
and so?" His patience and tact were memorable, and so too was the sense of
listening to someone who made a difference to history. To honour him, about
twelve Glasgow students visit the United States each year under the auspices of
the University's Brennan Project, to work with organisations representing
capital defendants.
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